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"IT'S NAVIGABLE IN FACT SO I CAN FISH IN
IT": THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO USE MAN-MADE,
NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT WATERS OF COASTAL
NORTH CAROLINA*
JOSEPH J. KALO
An increasingly common amenity of large residential coastal
developments in North Carolina is a man-made boat basin or
marina connected by a canal to the natural navigable-in-fact
waters of coastal rivers, tidal creeks, or estuarine waters. An
important question is whether waters of these man-made boat
basins, marinas, and canals are privately owned and privately
controlled or whether the waters retain their public character and
are open to public trust uses. Embedded within that question is
the fundamental policy question of whether public trust waters
and the living natural public trust resources within them may be
appropriated for purely private use. The recent court of appeals
Fish House case correctly concludes that these waters retain their
public character but does this with flawed reasoning. The
purpose of this Article is to show that despite its fIa wed reasoning
the decision of the Fish House court was correct. Prior North
Carolina case law, sound public policy, and pragmatic
considerations support the conclusion that all man-made
na vigable-in-fact waters connected to natural navigable-in-fact
waters are public trust waters open to public trust use rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Connected to the coastal rivers, tidal creeks, and sounds of the
inner coast of North Carolina are numerous man-made, navigable-in-
fact waterways and waterbodies.' Many of these were created to
provide various types of amenities for the private residential enclaves
that line the state's inner coastal waters.2 These man-made waterways
and waterbodies consist of canals snaking through waterfront
developments or large, private marinas or boat basins created by
dredging out privately owned uplands and connecting them to coastal
rivers or waters of the sounds.3 Following the path of the waters
1. Due to the lack of data from earlier years, the North Carolina Division of Coastal
Management does not have precise numbers for the marina basins created by excavation
of uplands and connected to natural navigable waters. See E-mail from Mike Lopazanski,
Policy Analysis Manager, N.C. Div. of Coastal Mgmt., to author (Mar. 2, 2011) (on file
with author). It is estimated that about sixty such upland basins were created. Id.
2. The planned SeaWatch Development is illustrative of such private developments.
SeaWatch is described as: "a master planned gated amenitized community" in Brunswick
County, North Carolina, located south of Wilmington, North Carolina. See What is the
Future for Sea Watch in Brunswick County North Carolina, SOUTHEAST DISCOVERY
(Nov. t5, 2010, 4:03 PM), http://www.southeastdiscovery.com/southern-way-of-life/2010/11
/what-is-the-future-for-seawatch-in-brunswick-county-north-carolina. A 267 slip safe-
harbor, full service marina spanning ten or more acres is planned for this community and
advertised as offering "residents an easily accessible, protected launching point for
cruising the Intracoastal Waterway and fun-filled excursions on the Atlantic Ocean." Id.
The planned marina will be "the largest of its kind in North Carolina south of New Bern."
Id.
3. See, e.g., supra notes 1-2. A Google Maps satellite view of Pine Knolls Shores,
North Carolina, provides an image of the some of the canals one finds running through
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entering these man-made waterways and waterbodies, fish and other
aquatic creatures come into these areas seeking shelter along the
shorelines or under the docks and piers.' Following the fish, much to
the displeasure of some of the homeowners, boat owners, and
homeowners' associations in these private developments, come
outsider fishermen in pursuit of a fine catch.' Some homeowners, boat
owners, and homeowners' associations believe that they have the
right to exclude these interloper fishermen.' After all, the canals,
marinas, or boat basins were created by digging up privately owned
uplands; the bottoms of these canals, marinas, and boat basins are
privately owned;7 and the traditional common law principle of
inner coast developments and connecting with coastal waters in North Carolina. See
GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (search "Pine Knolls Shores, North Carolina";
then follow "Search Maps" hyperlink; then follow "Satellite" hyperlink) (last visited Aug.
22, 2011).
4. Depending on time of year and many other variables, species of fish in these
waters would include "flounder, speckled trout, red drum, spot, croaker, pinfish, and
cutlass fish." E-mail from J. Allen Jernigan, Special Deputy Att'y Gen., Envtl. Div., N.C.
Dep't of Justice, to author (Mar. 4, 2011) (on file with author).
5. See Letter from David Kelly, Dir., Marina at St. James Plantation Owners Ass'n
Inc., Southport, N.C., to the N.C. Coastal Res. Law, Planning & Policy Ctr., N.C. State
Univ. (Aug. 13, 2009) (on file with author). Among the problems allegedly created by
outsiders fishing in the marina are "lines and hooks being accidently cast onto a boat
moored in a Marina slip"; "small fishing boats drift[ing] and anchor[ing]" and blocking
access to slips; and a "potential security situation." Id. One property owner complained
about fishermen in such a boat "being abusive." Id. The rules of the Marina prohibit any
fishing from boats docked in marina slips. Id.; see also Letter from resident, St. James
Plantation Marina, to Mr. Bill Bines, President, Marina Owners Ass'n (May 8, 2009)
(name withheld for privacy) (on file with author) (describing particular incidents involving
conflicts with fishermen); Letter from Daniel F. McLawhorn, Special Deputy Att'y Gen.,
N.C., to James D. Carter, Jr., Assistant Dist. Att'y, Elizabeth City, N.C. (May 15, 1987)
(on file with author) (responding to inquiry relating to whether the Waterview Shores
development may control public access to man-made canals within the development).
6. The Marina at St. James Plantation Owners Association Inc. contended that
"anchoring within the confines of our Marina can be controlled by us with any violation
being deemed to be 'Trespassing' ... under state law." Letter from David Kelly to the
N.C. Coastal Res. Law, Planning & Policy Ctr., supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., Steel Creek Dev. Corp. v. James, 58 N.C. App. 506, 511-12, 294 S.E.2d
23, 27 (1982) (noting that an owner of submerged land "owns also to the sky and to the
depths"). Steel Creek is discussed more fully infra in the text accompanying notes 82-89. In
a 1987 opinion letter, the Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Carolina
stated that it was the State's position that the bed of canals created by excavating uplands
may be privately owned. Letter from Daniel F. McLawhorn to James D. Carter, Jr., supra
note 5. This position was reaffirmed in a 1989 opinion letter. See Memorandum from Allen
Jernigan, Assistant Att'y Gen., N.C., to P.A. Wojciechowski, Submerged Lands
Coordinator (Aug. 8, 1989) (responding to the question "[a]re the beds of canals created
from high ground subject to private ownership?"). The court of appeals' language in Fish
House, Inc. v. Clarke, _ N.C. App. _, 693 S.E.2d 208, discretionary review denied, 364
N.C. 324, 700 S.E.2d 750 (2010), is inconsistent with these opinions of the Office of the
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ownership of the soil gives rights of ownership over the space above
and below it.8 That right of ownership, arguably, would give the right
to control and exclude the public from the water column above
privately owned submerged land.'
North Carolina law makes it crystal clear that all natural
navigable-in-fact waterways and waterbodies are open to public
navigation, fishing, and other public trust uses.o The key question is
whether these rights extend to man-made navigable-in-fact waterways
and waterbodies connected to natural navigable-in-fact waterways or
waterbodies." The recent North Carolina Court of Appeals decision
in Fish House, Inc. v. Clarkel2 recognizes the existence of such public
rights but does so based on flawed reasoning. Unfortunately, to reach
the correct result, the court conflates different aspects of the common
law public trust doctrine and creates unnecessary confusion in the
law. This gives rise to uncertainty over the status of the private title to
the submerged lands within these man-made waterways and
waterbodies."
Part I of this Article provides the essential facts of the Fish
House case, explains the court of appeals' misuse of the Supreme
Court of North Carolina's decision in Gwathmey v. State ex rel.
Attorney General for the State of North Carolina. As to that language, my position is that
the Office of the Attorney General's opinions are the correct statement of the law, the
language of the court of appeals notwithstanding.
8. E.g., PATRICK K. HETRICK & JAMES B. MCLAUGHLIN, JR., WEBSTER'S REAL
ESTATE LAW IN NORTH CAROLINA § 1.7, at 12 (5th ed. 1999) (explaining scope of the
word "land").
9. See, e.g., Steel Creek, 58 N.C. App. at 512, 294 S.E.2d at 27 (holding that an owner
of submerged lands may prohibit others from placing permanent structures in waters
overlying submerged lands).
10. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-45.1 (2010) (" '[Plublic trust rights' ... include, but
are not limited to, the right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational
activities in the watercourses of the State .... ").
11. No reported case exists in which there was an attempt to prosecute fishermen for
trespassing because they entered a private boat basin or private canal. That may be
because the Office of the Attorney General for the State of North Carolina's position is
that opening canals or boat basins to the public waters of the state "automatically
subjected them and [their waters] to a public trust easement." Letter from Daniel F.
McLawhorn to James D. Carter, Jr., supra note 5. In addition, in Bell v. Smith, 171 N.C.
116, 87 S.E. 987 (1916), the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated that "[tihe right to
fish in navigable waters is open to all." Id. at 117, 87 S.E. at 988.
12. _ N.C. App _, 693 S.E.2d 208, discretionary review denied, 364 N.C. 324, 700
S.E.2d 750 (2010).
13. See Chris Burti, Manmade Canal Held to Be Public Trust Lands by COA, 179
STATEWIDE TITLE NEWSL. & LEGAL MEMORANDUM (June 1, 2010), http://statenet
.net/newsletterarticle.asp?Article=311.
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Department of Environment, Health, & Natural Resources,14 and
discusses why the court of appeals' language has raised concerns
about the legitimacy of private titles to submerged lands. Part A of
Part II will first explain what the Gwathmeydecision was really about
and the important distinction between the question of whether
submerged lands are publicly or privately owned and the question of
whether a waterbody is open to public use. Part B will address the
fundamental question of whether as a matter of law and public policy
man-made navigable-in-fact waterbodies connected to natural
navigable-in-fact waterbodies are open to public trust use rights, such
as navigation and fishing." Part B will demonstrate that the public's
right to use navigable-in-fact watersl6 is not tied to any claims of
public ownership of the submerged lands lying under such waters and
that North Carolina case law does not distinguish between natural
and man-made navigable-in-fact waters. Part B will also explain why
federal law does not prohibit public trust uses of man-made
navigable-in-fact waters in North Carolina. Part B concludes with a
discussion of the pragmatic and sound public policy considerations
supporting public trust uses of such navigable-in-fact man-made
waterbodies.
I. FISH Ho USE, INC. V. CLARKE
A. The Underlying Dispute
The dispute in Fish House was between two neighboring fish
house operators whose businesses are situated along a common, man-
made, navigable-in-fact" canal called "Old Sam Spencer Ditch.""
14. 342 N.C. 287, 464 S.E.2d 674 (1995).
15. § 1-45.1 provides:
"[P]ublic trust rights" means those rights held in trust by the State for the use and
benefit of the people of the State in common. They are established by common
law as interpreted by the courts of this State. They include, but are not limited to,
the right to navigate, swim, hunt, fish, and enjoy all recreational activities in the
watercourses of the State ....
16. For convenience, the shorthand "man-made navigable-in-fact waters" will be used
in this Article to refer to man-made navigable-in-fact waters connected to natural
navigable-in-fact waters. Only such waters are the subject of this Article. Any man-made
waterbodies not having such a connection are beyond the scope of this Article.
17. Fish House, _ N.C. App. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 210-11. Neither party claimed that
the canal was not navigable in fact. See id. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 212.
18. Id. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 210. The plaintiff was actually a lessee with the ability to
bring a trespass action by virtue of his right to possession. See infra note 20.
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This dead-end canal connects both fish houses' facilities with the
Pamlico Sound.19 According to the court of appeals, the canal runs
along the border of the two properties but lies wholly within the
plaintiffs property lines.20 That being true, the canal was created by
dredging land to which plaintiffs predecessors in interest held fee
title at that time. The litigation arose because boats headed to the
defendant's fish house enter the canal and tie up on plaintiffs side of
the canal.21 This apparently interferes with boats attempting to access
plaintiffs fish house.22 Consequently, plaintiff brought a trespass
action seeking to enjoin the defendant from blocking and impeding
the use of the canal.23 The plaintiff argued that, even if the canal were
navigable, the plaintiff could exclude the defendant;2 4 however, the
trial court found that the waters of the canal are navigable waters in
which public trust rights exist.25 The trial court then dismissed the
action, holding that neither party had any rights in the canal except as
members of the public.26 In other words, the canal is public waters,
open to public navigation, and the plaintiff has no private right of
action. When the case reached the court of appeals, the court agreed
with the trial court that the canal, although man-made, is a navigable
waterway "held by the state in trust for all citizens of North Carolina"
and affirmed the trial court's order.27
19. Fish House, _N.C. App. at, 693 S.E.2d at 210.
20. Id. (describing the canal as "[1]ocated on the western border of Plaintiffs property
and to the east of Defendant's"). The court's statement makes it appear that the canal lies
wholly within the Plaintiffs property lines. However, Lloyd C. Smith, Jr., the attorney for
the defendant, provides a slightly different set of facts. According to Mr. Smith, the
defendant claimed to the middle of the canal, a fact hotly disputed by the plaintiff. That
issue was never resolved due to the trial court basing its opinion on the navigability of the
canal. See E-mail from Lloyd C. Smith, Jr. to author (Apr. 13, 2011) (on file with author).
One hundred years ago the original ditch was enlarged and the canal created. See id. Some
of the historical information relating to the history of the canal may have been lost when
Mr. Smith's office was flooded on September 30, 2010. See id. Plaintiff purchased the
property in 1992 and sold it to another company in 2005. Fish House, _ N.C. App. at ,
693 S.E.2d at 210. The new owner then immediately leased it back to the plaintiff. Id. So at
the time the action arose, the plaintiff was in possession under a lease. Id.
21. Fish House, N.C. App. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 210.
22. See id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at ,693 S.E.2d at 211.
25. Id. at ,693 S.E.2d at 210.
26. Id.
27. Id. at ,693 S.E.2d at 211.
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B. Wrong Reasoning; Uncertainties Created
In Fish House, the court of appeals relied heavily upon the
Supreme Court of North Carolina's 1995 decision in Gwathmey.2 In
its opinion, the Fish House court first states that " '[u]nder the public
trust doctrine, the lands under navigable waters are held in trust by
the State for the benefit of the public and the benefit and enjoyment
of North Carolina's submerged lands is available to all its citizens ...
for navigation, fishing and commerce.' "29 Then the court continues:
Our Supreme Court has clarified the law on navigability in the
context of the public [trust] doctrine succinctly: "[A]ll
watercourses are regarded as navigable in law that are
navigable in fact." The Court has explained that "if a body of
water in its natural condition can be navigated, it is navigable in
fact and, therefore, navigable in law, even if it has not been
used for such purpose."30
Finally, the court of appeals concludes: "[t]hose lands submerged
under such waters that are navigable in law are the subject of the
North Carolina public trust doctrine.""
This last statement suggests that submerged lands lying under
waters that meet North Carolina's navigable-in-fact test are state-
owned submerged lands. And that suggestion is generating concern
about the legitimacy of private claims of title to submerged lands
lying under man-made waterbodies. As Chris Burti, Vice-President
and Senior Legal Counsel for Statewide Title, one of the largest title
insurance companies in the state,32 explains:
the implications [of the Fish House case] portend a disastrous
economic impact for owners of every submerged parcel of
property in North Carolina upon which waters ... flow by
reason of manmade changes where it can be said that those
waters are navigable in that [the Fish House] opinion creates a
wholesale grant of their submerged lands to the State of North
Carolina. There are hundreds of owners of boat slips in dozens
of manmade marinas and harbors involving hundreds of
28. Id.
29. Id. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 210 (quoting Parker v. New Hanover Cnty., 173 N.C. App.
644, 653, 619 S.E.2d 868, 875 (2005)).
30. Id. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 211 (quoting Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep't of Env't
Health & Natural Res., 342 N.C. 287, 300-01, 464 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1995)).
31. Idat _,693 S.E.2dat208,210-11.
32. See TheHistoryofStatewide Title, STATEWIDE TITLE, INC., http://www
.statewidetitle.com/history.htm (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
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millions of dollars in investments that will likely become
uninsurable and possibly inalienable as a practical matter.33
This uncertainty stems from the failure of the court of appeals to
appreciate the difference between cases in which the issue is whether
navigable-in-fact waters are open to public use and cases in which the
issue is whether fee title to submerged lands, free of public trust
rights, have passed into private hands.
The Fish House court ties the public's right to use navigable-in-
fact waters to state ownership of the underlying submerged lands.34
However, state ownership of submerged lands under navigable-in-fact
waters is not the sine qua non of the public trust right to use
navigable-in-fact waters and never has been." Under North Carolina
law, the common law test of navigability is relevant in two related
contexts. The first is in answering the question of whether a particular
waterbody is open to public use. These are "public trust use" cases.
The second is in answering the question of whether submerged lands
located under a particular waterbody or waterway are state-owned
public trust lands, title to which remains in the state absent an explicit
act of the General Assembly authorizing the transfer of title to
private parties." These are "title determination" cases. Gwathmeyis a
title determination case; the Fish House case is a "public trust use"
case.
II. PUBLIC OR PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF SUBMERGED LANDS
VERSUS THE PUBLIC RIGHT TO USE NAVIGABLE-IN-FACT WATERS
A. WhatGwathmey Was Really A bout: Title to Submerged Lands
Under Navigable-in-Fact Waters
The Fish House court's linking of the public right of use of
navigable-in-fact waters to public ownership of submerged lands is at
best a case of judicial loose language and at worst a misunderstanding
33. Burti, supra note 13.
34. Id.
35. See infra notes 53-80 and accompanying text.
36. One holding of Gwathmeyis that the General Assembly has the power to convey
fee title to a private party without reserving public trust use rights "but under the public
trust doctrine it will be presumed not to have done so. That presumption is rebutted by a
special grant of the General Assembly conveying the lands ... free of all public trust
rights, but only if the special grant does so in the clearest and most express terms."
Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep't of Env't Health & Natural Res., 342 N.C. 287, 304, 464
S.E.2d 674, 684 (1995).
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of the Gwathmey decision. The core dispute in Gwathmey was the
validity of a private claim to a salt marsh located in Middle Sound in
southeastern North Carolina.37 The basis of the plaintiffs' claim was
State Board of Education deeds issued between 1926 and 1945." Prior
to the issuance of the deeds, title to the salt marsh was in the State."
The plaintiffs' contention was that the Board of Education deeds
transferred to them fee title to the marshlands and that this fee title
was held free of any public trust use rights.40 The State, on the other
hand, contended that any interest the plaintiffs received was subject
to public trust use rights.4' A preliminary, yet central, issue was
whether the salt marsh was state-owned public trust submerged lands
at the time of transfer of title. The answer to that question depended
on what was the correct test for navigability. For if the salt marsh was
"lands lying under navigable waters," then the salt marsh was state-
owned public trust submerged lands.42 As such, the salt marsh was
subject to public trust use rights unless the State made a valid
conveyance transferring title to the plaintiffs free of public trust use
rights. 43
The problem confronting the Gwathmey court was that the
relevant case law was a bit of a mess." There is case law supporting an
37. Id. at 290-91, 464 S.E.2d at 676. The plaintiffs' claims also included submerged
lands lying under the waters of Howe Creek. Id. at 291, 464 S.E.2d at 676.
38. Id. at 290, 464 S.E.2d at 676.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 290-91, 464 S.E.2d at 676. In fact the trial court found that the plaintiffs
were the owners in fee simple absolute of the submerged lands at issue and they held title
free of public trust rights. Id. at 292, 464 S.E.2d at 677. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina vacated the judgment of the trial court on the ground that the trial court may not
have applied the correct test for navigability. Id. at 310-11, 464 S.E.2d at 688. On remand,
the trial court determined the waters under which the submerged lands at issue were
navigable and that the plaintiffs' title to the submerged lands was subject to the public
trust. See Judgment in Wain wright v. North Carolina, General Court of Justice, Superior
Court Division, No. 91 CVS 640, 816, 1117, 1458, 1790, at 18 (1997).
41. Gwathmey, 342 N.C. at 291, 306,464 S.E.2d at 677, 685.
42. The general common law rule in North Carolina and all other states is that the
State holds title to submerged lands under navigable waters and such lands are held as
public trust lands. See, e.g., State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 607, 48 S.E. 586, 587-88 (1904);
Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Atl. Hotel, 132 N.C. 517,526-28,44 S.E. 39,42 (1903); Tatum
v. Sawyer, 9 N.C. (2 Hawks) 226, 229 (1822).
43. The other major issues in the case were: (1) did the General Assembly have the
power to authorize a conveyance of such lands free of the public trust use rights? and (2)
did the General Assembly in fact make such an authorization? Gwathmey, 342 N.C. at 292,
301-08, 464 S.E.2d at 677, 682-86.
44. Id. at 311, 464 S.E.2d at 688 ("As we have indicated throughout this opinion, the
law involving the public trust doctrine has been recognized by this and other courts as
having become unnecessarily complex and at times conflicting."). The Gwathmeydecision
21032011]
NORTH CAROLINA LA WREVIEW
"ebb and flow" or tidal test,4 5 a "sea vessel" test,46 and a "navigable-
in-fact" test.47 And, to further complicate matters, differences of
opinion existed as to what constitutes "navigability-in-fact." 48 The
G wathmey court reviewed the existing law,49 discarded all conflicting
precedent,o and set forth the modern navigable-in-fact test." The
court then vacated the judgment of the trial court in favor of the
plaintiffs and remanded the case. On remand, the trial court found
required the court to discard these conflicting cases. See, e.g., id. at 298, 464 S.E.2d at 680
("This part of our decision [in Resort Development Co. v. Parmele, 235 N.C. 689, 71
S.E.2d 474 (1952)] was based on our prior erroneous interpretation of the law ... and also
is hereby expressly disavowed.").
45. See State v. Glen, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321, 333 (1859) ("All the bays and inlets on
our coast, where the tide from the sea ebbs and flows ... are called navigable, in a
technical sense . . . .").
46. See id. ("[A]ll other waters, whether sounds, rivers or creeks, which can be
navigated by sea vessels, are called navigable . . . .").
47. E.g., State v. Narrows Island Club, 100 N.C. 477,.481, 5 S.E. 411, 412 (1888)
("[T]he public have the right to use rivers, lakes, sounds and parts of them, though not
strictly public waters, if they be navigable, in fact . . . .").
48. In fact, the trial court in Gwathmeyappears to have applied an "actual current and
historical use" test to determine whether the salt marsh was navigable in fact. Gwathmey,
342 N.C. at 292, 310-11, 464 S.E.2d at 677, 688. That approach was incorrect on two
grounds. First, the Gwathmey decision states that navigability in fact can be based on the
fact that navigation by watercraft is possible even if no watercraft has ever navigated the
waterbody. Id. at 301, 311, 464 S.E.2d at 682, 688. Second, if the open waters of Middle
Sound are navigable in fact under the full breadth rule, the full breadth of a navigable-in-
fact body of water is considered navigable in law and not just the part of the waterbody
that is actually navigable by vessels. See, e.g., Ward v. Willis, 51 N.C. (6 Jones) 183, 185-86
(1858).
49. Gwathmey, 342 N.C. at 293-301, 464 S.E.2d at 677-82.
50. See id. In fact, the court disavows two of its earlier decisions, id. at 297-98, 464
S.E.2d at 680, and explains how it believes other earlier opinions should be read. Id. at
298-99,464 S.E.2d at 681.
51. According to the court:
The controlling law of navigability as it relates to the public trust doctrine in North
Carolina is as follows: " 'If water is navigable for pleasure boating it must be
regarded as navigable water, though no craft has ever been put upon it for the
purpose of trade or agriculture. The purpose of navigation is not the subject of
inquiry, but the fact of the capacity of the water for use in navigation.'" In other
words, if a body of water in its natural condition can be navigated by watercraft, it
is navigable in fact and, therefore, navigable in law, even if it has not been used for
such purpose. Lands lying beneath such waters that are navigable in law are the
subject of the public trust doctrine.
Id. at 301, 464 S.E.2d at 682 (emphasis added) (citations omitted) (quoting State v.
Twiford, 136 N.C. 603, 608-09, 48 S.E. 586, 588 (1904)).
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that any title to the salt marsh conveyed to the plaintiff was indeed
subject to public trust use rights.5 2
Properly read and confined to its facts, Gwathmeysimply decides
the narrow question of whether certain state-owned submerged lands
lying under natural navigable-in-fact waters were conveyed by the
State free of public trust use rights. It did not hold that all submerged
lands lying under navigable-in-fact waters, whether natural or man-
made, are state-owned public trust submerged lands. Therefore, there
is nothing in the Gwathmey decision that brings into question the
legitimacy of private titles to man-made submerged lands lying under
artificially created navigable-in-fact waters connected to natural
navigable-in-fact waters. Consequently, it is important in future
opinions that the court of appeals takes care in its use of Gwathmey
and at the earliest opportunity remove any cloud on such titles
created by its loose language in the Fish House opinion.
Although the court of appeals misused Gwathmey in deciding
Fish House, it does not mean the court reached the wrong result.
Explicit judicial recognition of a public right to use all navigable
waters-whether natural or man-made-for navigation, fishing, and
other public trust uses is consistent with the historical development of
public trust rights and other cases involving man-made waters.
Furthermore, both pragmatic and public policy considerations
support the result in Fish House.
B. The Public Trust Right to Use Na vigable-in-Fact Waters
1. Development of the Public Trust Right to Use Navigable-in-Fact
Waters
Deeply imbedded in the common law is the concept of the public
character of waters suitable for navigation, fishing, water commerce,
52. See Judgment in Wain wright v. North Carolina, supra note 40, at 18. This did not
deprive the plaintiffs of title to the submerged lands in the area of the salt marsh but only
determined that the area subject to the conveyance was also subject to public trust use
rights. Id. In the Gwathmey decision, the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that the
General Assembly had conveyed submerged lands under navigable waters to the Board of
Education subject to public trust use rights. Gwathmey, 342 N.C. at 307, 464 S.E.2d at 686.
Therefore, if any part of the salt marsh area conveyed to the plaintiffs by the Board was
covered by navigable waters, title was taken subject to public trust use rights. Id. ("[I]f ...
the marshlands at issue in this case are covered by navigable waters, the people of North
Carolina retain their full public trust rights.").
21052011]
NORTH CAROLINA LA WREVIEW
and other water-based uses." Over the past three hundred or more
years, as modes of commerce and water-based activities have evolved
and waterways and waterbodies not previously used were determined
to be suitable for these activities, challenges were raised to the public
character of these waterways and waterbodies.5 4 In most jurisdictions,
the challenge has been rebuffed and the public character affirmed
until all navigable-in-fact tidal waters and all navigable-in-fact
freshwaters have been brought under this umbrella concept." The
key question has always been whether the waterway or waterbody
was "navigable."" Inevitably judicial definitions of navigability were
colored by the existing uses of waters and the technology of the
times." The evolution of North Carolina's common law definition of
"navigability" stands as one example of this process, a process not
unique to North Carolina.
Early in North Carolina's history, the courts rejected the
traditional English common law rule that only tidal waters were
"navigable" waters open to public use." In 1828, in Wilson v. Forbes,"
the Supreme Court of North Carolina stated that the English rule "is
entirely inapplicable to our situation, arising both from the great
lengths of our rivers, extending far into the interior, and the sand-bars
and other obstructions at their mouths."6 0 The court declined to
provide a specific, definitive test for "navigability" because the case
53. See generally, e.g., 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 29.01, 29.02(b), 32.01 to .03
(Robert E. Beck ed., repl. vol. 2004) (discussing the roots of the public right to water as
well as the various tests for determining which waters are subject to the public right).
54. see generally 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 6.02(f) (Amy K. Kelly ed., repl.
vol. 2007) (distinguishing public waters from private waters); 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS, supra note 53, §§ 33.02 to .03 (discussing the historical expansion of the scope of
public waters in many states).
55. See, e.g., 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 54, § 6.02(f), at 6-184 to
-192.
56. See id. at 6-184 ("Traditionally, the central characteristic of public waters is that
they are natural and navigable.").
57. See generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 53, §§ 32.01 to .03
(describing different tests that jurisdictions use to distinguish waters open to public use
from those not subject to public use); Monica K. Kalo & Joseph J. Kalo, The Battle To
Preserve North Carolina 's Estuarine Marshes: The 1985 Legislation, Private Claims To
Estuarine Marshes, Denial OfPermits To Fill, And The Public Trus4 64 N.C. L. REV. 565,
578-84 (1986) (describing the development of the common law definition of "navigability"
in North Carolina up to 1986).
58. See Ingram v. Threadgill, 14 N.C. (3 Dev.) 59, 61 (1831); see also, e.g., State v.
Dibble, 49 N.C. (4 Jones) 107, 110 (1856) (calling this English ebb and flow rule "entirely
inapplicable").
59. 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30 (1828).
60. Id. at 34-35.
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did not require it." However, the court suggested that a waterway
meeting a "sea vessel" test would be public waters. According to
Justice Henderson, "a creek or river, such as this appears to be, wide
and deep enough for sea vessels to navigate ... is a navigable stream
within the general rule."62 Then in 1859, in a case involving an alleged
obstruction to the passage of fish in the Yadkin River, the court
accepted the fact that the bed of the river could be privately owned,
but stated that there was "an easement in the public for the purposes
of the transportation of lime, flour, and other articles in flats and
canoes."63 Later in 1886, in Broadnax v. Baker,' the court once again
expanded the definition of navigability. According to the court:
Navigable waters, constituting highways, are not ascertained
here, as they are in England, an island accessible to ocean tides,
by the extent of their ebb and flow, but by a more practical test
of their capacity to float boats used as instruments of
commerce, in the interchange of commodities, and large
enough for the purpose. Such waters lose not their navigability,
because intercepted by falls, when above and below them, the
waters can be thus used for the purpose of commerce for long
distances.6 1
When the lumber industry began booming in the late 1800s, the
use of the western North Carolina rivers as instruments to move logs
to mills was important to the economy of the State. 6 Initially, the
court struggled with the question of whether waters insufficient to
float boats but sufficient to float logs were open to public use.
61. Id.at35,38.
62. Id. at 35. Later, in Collins v. Benbury, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 277 (1842), the court
described navigable watersas "any waters, which are sufficient in fact to afford a common
passage for all people in sea vessels." Id. at 282. In Collins the issue was whether a certain
portion of the Albemarle Sound was open to public fishing. See id. at 277-81; see also
Collins v. Benbury, 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 118 (1844) (appealing the prior decision of the court).
63. State v. Glen, 52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321, 326-27 (1859).
64. 94 N.C. (5 Ired.) 675 (1886).
65. Id. at 681.
66. See, e.g., Gwaltney v. Scottish Carolina Timber & Land Co., Ill N.C. 547, 553-60,
16 S.E. 692, 693-94 (1892) (MacRae, J., concurring) (discussing growth of western North
Carolina timber industry and whether streams floatable for logs are "navigable"); id. at
563, 16 S.E. at 696 (Avery, J., dissenting) (describing timber of great value in sixteen
mountain counties and large amount of logs moved by river). See generally J.G. DE
ROULHAC HAMILTON, 3 HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA 391 (1919) (noting that lumber
and woodworking industries followed cotton and tobacco manufacturing in economic
importance).
67. See Kalo & Kalo, supra note 57, at 581-83 n.108 (detailing the history of the
court's struggle with the classification of western North Carolina rivers).
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Finally in Commissioners ofBurke County v. Catawba Lumber Co., 8
the court settled the question. The result was that if rivers are
"floatable, they are natural highways, in which the public have, as in
other water highways, an easement, the reasonable use of which is
paramount . . . ."69
The Supreme Court of North Carolina returned to public use of
North Carolina's coastal waters in 1904 in an obstruction of
navigation case-State v Twiford.0 This case is important for two
reasons. First, it set forth what has become the basis for the modern
North Carolina test for navigability.n According to the Twiford court,
"[i]f a stream is 'navigable in fact . . ., it is navigable in law.' "72 And,
" 'the public have the right to the unobstructed navigation as a public
highway for all purposes of pleasure or profit of all water courses,
whether tidal or inland, that are in their natural condition capable of
such use.' "
Second, it made clear that the public rights of use are not
affected by any private ownership of the bottom of navigable waters.7 4
The defendants in Twiford, employees of the riparian owner, had
placed stakes in the creek creating the obstruction." The riparian
owner claimed title to the bottom of the creek by reason of a state
grant;" however, the court determined that grant was void.77
Nonetheless the court stated that "[e]ven if the grant passed a title to
the lands covered by the waters of the creek, the title became vested
in the owner subject to the public easement-the right of
navigation."" Therefore, reading together western North Carolina
river cases, Twiford, and similar coastal cases, there can be little
doubt that the public right of use of navigable-in-fact waters exists
regardless of whether the underlying submerged lands are owned by
the State or are in private hands. Furthermore, this right is not limited
68. 116 N.C. 731, 21 S.E 941 (1895).
69. Id. at 741, 21 S.E. at 945.
70. 136 N.C. 603,48 S.E. 586 (1904).
71. See Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Res., 342 N.C.
287, 300-01, 464 S.E.2d 674, 682 (1995) (quoting Twiford with approval as controlling law
of navigability as it relates to the public trust doctrine in North Carolina).
72. Twiford, 136 N.C. at 606, 48 S.E. at 587.
73. Id. at 607-08, 48 S.E. at 588 (quoting State v. Baum, 128 N.C. 600, 604, 38 S.E. 900,
901 (1901)).
74. See supra text accompanying note 73.
75. Twiford, 136 N.C. at 604-05, 48 S.E. at 587.
76. Id. at 604, 48 S.E. at 587.
77. Id. at 607, 48 S.E. at 587.
78. Id. at 607, 48 S.E. at 588.
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to navigation, but also includes other public trust uses appropriate to
the waterbody, such as fishing.79 In many cases, this public trust right
to fish in navigable-in-fact waters has been affirmed by the courts of
the state."o The key criterion for determining whether waters are open
to public trust uses is whether the waters are navigable in fact. It is
that criterion that makes available the coastal waters and the western
rivers of the state to kayakers, canoeists, fishermen, and other
recreational waters users.
2. North Carolina Case Law Draws No Distinction Between Natural
and Man-Made Navigable-in-Fact Waters
Although it is true in prior cases the Supreme Court of North
Carolina has referred to navigable waters in their natural condition,
that does not preclude public trust uses of man-made navigable-in-
fact waters connected to existing naturalnavigable-in-fact waters. The
Fish House court viewed "natural condition" as reflecting "only upon
the manner in which the water flows without diminution or
obstruction."' The Fish House court may be correct; however,
another possibility is that the Supreme Court of North Carolina
simply has never considered whether man-made navigable-in-fact
waters are open to public trust uses and the use of the phrase "natural
condition" simply reflects the fact that in the decided cases the
waterbody at issue was a natural one. Furthermore, at least four
North Carolina Court of Appeals decisions suggest that no distinction
is drawn in North Carolina law between natural navigable-in-fact
waters and man-made navigable-in-fact waters connected to existing
navigable waters.
In Steel Creek Development Corp. v. James,82 a 1982 court of
appeals decision, the plaintiff asserted that the defendants were
trespassing on its submerged lands located under Lake Wylie, a lake
79. See, e.g., Shepard's Point Land Co. v. Ati. Hotel, 132 N.C. 517, 526, 44 S.E. 39, 42
(1903) (noting that title to public trust waters is "held in trust for the people of the State,
that they may enjoy the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have
liberty of fishing therein"). For a statutory list of public trust rights, see N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 1-45.1 (2010).
80. E.g., Twiford, 136 N.C. at 609, 48 S.E. at 588 ("Navigable waters are free. They
cannot be sold or monopolized. They can belong to no one but the public and are reserved
for free and unrestricteduse by the public for all time." (emphasis added)); State v. Glen,
52 N.C. (7 Jones) 321, 333 (1859) ("In [navigable waters], .. . the right of fishing is free.").
81. Fish House, Inc. v. Clarke, _ N.C. App. , _, 693 S.E.2d 208, 212, discretionary
review denied, 364 N.C. 324, 700 S.E.2d 750 (2010).
82. 58 N.C. App. 506, 294 S.E.2d 23 (1982).
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formed by damming a portion of the Catawaba River." The alleged
trespass consisted of the construction of two boathouses, both of
which were anchored on the plaintiffs submerged lands.84 The trial
court entered an order directing defendants to remove the
boathouses from the waters overlying plaintiffs submerged lands."
The defendants appealed.
Interestingly, the issue of whether Lake Wylie was a navigable
water was raised for the first time on appeal." Based on the limited
factual record before the court of appeals, it said that the evidence in
the record was insufficient to determine whether the lake was
navigable, and the court did not consider that issue in reaching its
decision." Nonetheless, the case is somewhat instructive. On one
hand, the court reaffirmed the traditional common law principle that
"the owner of submerged land, like the owner of dry land, owns also
to the sky and to the depths";" but on the other hand, the court only
recognized the right of the submerged land owner "to proscribe
permanent fixtures lying above such land."" The court did not hold
that the waters were closed to public navigation. Such a conclusion
would be inconsistent with reality. Lake Wylie, which lies in part in
both North Carolina and South Carolina, is capable of supporting
commercial navigation90 and is a popular recreational boating and
fishing site.9'
83. Id. at 508, 294 S.E.2d at 25.
84. Id. at 509-10, 294 S.E.2d at 25-26.
85. Id. at 510, 294 S.E.2d at 26.
86. Id. at 511-12, 294 S.E.2d at 27.
87. Id. It is also interesting that the court refused to follow a then recent United States
district court decision-Hartman v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 114, 117 (D.S.C. 1981)-
that found the waters of Lake Wylie, which also lies within South Carolina, to be
navigable for purposes of admiralty jurisdiction. See Steel Creek, 58 N.C. App. at 512 n.1,
294 S.E.2d at 27 n.1.
88. Steel Creek, 58 N.C. App. at 512, 294 S.E.2d at 27.
89. Id.
90. Hartman v. United States, 522 F. Supp. 114, 117 (D.S.C. 1981) ("Lake Wylie is
susceptible of being traversed by commercial craft between states and is therefore
navigable for purposes of invoking admiralty jurisdiction."). Interestingly, the Hartman
court stated that a waterbody used or susceptible for use only "by non-commercial
fishermen, water skiers, and pleasure boat[s]" is not a navigable body of water for federal
admiralty jurisdiction. Id. at 116. However, such a waterbody would qualify as a navigable-
in-fact body of water under North Carolina law. See, e.g., State v. Twiford, 136 N.C. 603,
608-09, 48 S.E. 586, 588 (1904) ("If water is navigable for pleasure boating it must be
regarded as navigable water .... The purpose of navigation is not the subject of inquiry
.... (quoting Att'y Gen. v. Woods, 108 Mass. 436,440, 11 Am. Rep. 380, 382 (1871))).
91. See LAKE WYLIE MARINE COMMISSION, http://www.lakewyliemarinecommission
.com (last visited Aug. 22, 2011).
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In a more recent court of appeals case, Bauman v. Woodlake
Partners, LL C,9 2 the right to navigate waters lying over privately
owned submerged lands was directly in issue. Woodlake Country
Club, a gated community in Moore County, contains a twelve
hundred acre lake "formed by the damming of two creeks, one of
which [was] Crane's Creek."93 When an annual fee was imposed upon
Woodlake property owners, plaintiffs challenged the fee on the basis
that the waters of the lake were navigable waters open to public
navigation under state and federal law.94 The key issue in the case was
whether the lake was created by damming an existing navigable
waterway.9 5 Although the plaintiffs offered evidence that small
portions of Crane's Creek above the lake were navigable in fact,"
they did not offer any evidence as to whether the creek, in its pre-dam
natural condition, was navigable in fact in the area in which the lake
was located." It was on this failure of proof that the plaintiffs lost the
case." However, the court concedes that if adequate evidence of
navigability had been presented, then the waters of the lake would be
public trust waters and no fee could be imposed for use of the
waters."
92. 199 N.C. App. 441, 681 S.E.2d 819 (2009).
93. Id. at 442, 681 S.E.2d at 820-21.
94. Id. at 442-43, 681 S.E.2d at 821.
95. Id. at 446-47, 450-51, 681 S.E.2d at 823-24, 826.
96. Id. at 443-44, 451-53, 681 S.E.2d at 821-22, 826-27.
97. Id. at 451, 681 S.E.2d at 826. The plaintiffs' evidence did not show that, prior to
the damming of the creek, it was navigable in its natural condition at the site of the lake or
downstream. Id. at 449, 451, 681 S.E.2d at 825-26, Plaintiffs' evidence was that it was
possible to paddle a canoe or kayak one-half mile upstream from the lake and that stream
was also passable by canoe and kayak several miles upstream from the lake at two
locations. Id. at 449, 451, 681 S.E.2d at 825, 826. The evidence did not show that the creek
was navigable from the lake to the points several miles upstream. Id. at 449, 451, 681
S.E.2d at 825, 826.
98. Id. at 453-54, 681 S.E.2d at 827-28.
99. See id. at 454, 681 S.E.2d at 828. Unfortunately, some of the language in Bauman,
just as in Fish House, suggests that if waters are navigable in fact, then the underlying
submerged lands are state-owned public trust lands. For example, at one point the court
says, "[tihough 'the extent of the public trust ownership of North Carolina is confused and
uncertain ... the Supreme Court of North Carolina has affirmed original state ownership
of ... lands under all waters navigable-in-fact.'" Id. at 448, 681 S.E.2d at 824 (quoting
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C. L. REV. 1,
17 (1972-73)). The continued loose use of such language is misleading. That language has
no application to the state of title to uplands flooded by the damming of natural navigable-
in-fact waters. If the uplands were in private ownership before being flooded, they
continue to be in private ownership after being flooded. In such circumstances, the
relevance of the public trust doctrine is limited to protecting the public's right to use all
navigable-in-fact waters free of unauthorized obstructions or limitations. Despite the loose
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In addition to Steel Creek and Bauman, two court of appeals
riparian rights cases draw no distinction between natural navigable-
in-fact waters and man-made navigable-in-fact waters connected to
natural navigable-in-fact waters. In Pine KnollAss'n. v. Cardon,oo the
issue was a claim of interference with riparian rights. 0 ' Both parties
owned water frontage on a navigable man-made canal.102 Without any
discussion of the fact that the waterway was man-made, the Cardon
court held that both parties were landowners with common law
riparian rights.o3 More recently, in Newcomb v. County of Cartere04
the court of appeals directly confronted the issue of whether "riparian
rights only attach to natural, as compared to artificial, bodies of
water."'o In Newcomb, property owners with waterfront land
adjacent to a man-made harbor in Marshallberg, North Carolina
claimed common law riparian rights, in particular the right to wharf
out."o6 According to the court, whether waterfront landowners "have
riparian rights ... does not hinge upon whether the harbor was
natural or manmade."0 7 Because Marshallberg Harbor was "clearly
'capable of navigation by watercraft,' "o. it was navigable in fact and
therefore the claimed riparian rights existed.'09 Therefore, if a man-
language in Steel Creek and Bauman, in both cases a finding that the waters were
navigable-in-fact would have meant that the waters were open to unobstructed, free public
use.
100. 126 N.C. App. 155, 484 S.E.2d 446 (1997).
101. Id. at 159, 484 S.E.2d at 447. Plaintiff and defendant owned lots adjoining a
navigable man-made canal in a subdivision in Pine Knoll Shores, North Carolina. Plaintiff
alleged that defendant's dock and manner of mooring his boats interfered with its riparian
rights. Id. at 157-59, 484 S.E.2d at 447-48.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 159-60, 484 S.E.2d at 449. Although it is said that "[i]t is axiomatic that
riparian rights do not attach to artificial waterbodies," the courts frequently apply the
common law riparian rights doctrine to waterfront owners situated along an artificial
waterbody. 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 54, § 6.02(e), at 6-173 to -174. In
some instances, it may be because an artificial waterway was substituted for a existing
natural waterway, as when a natural stream is deepened or widened, or because of what
appeared to be the parties' expectations, or simply because the common law doctrine is a
convenient measure of the rights of waterfront owners in a situation in which the parties
have left them undefined. See, e.g., id. at 6-174 to -175. In the Cardon case, the court of
appeals never explained the basis of its assumption that the parties possessed riparian
rights.
104. _ N.C. App. _, 701 S.E.2d 325 (2010).
105. Id. at _, 701 S.E.2d at 336.
106. Id. at __ 701 S.E.2d at 331 (stating the plaintiffs' claim for riparian rights). For a
history of the construction of Marshallberg Harbor, see id. at . 701 S.E.2d at 329-31.





made waterbody constitutes navigable waters for purposes of private
riparian rights, the same waterbody should constitute navigable
waters for purposes of public use.
3. Public Trust Uses of Man-Made Waterbodies is Not Prohibited By
Federal Case Law
When the issue of private control of waters has arisen, the
owners of the submerged lands sometimes argue that the Supreme
Court of the United States decision in Kaiser-Aetna v. United States"o
stands for the proposition that no public right exists in the waters of
marinas or boat basins created by a man-made connection to
navigable-in-fact waters, and that imposition of such a right would
constitute an unconstitutional taking of private property rights
without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution."' However, any reliance on the Kaiser-
Aetna case is misplaced.112
The waterbody at issue in Kaiser-Aetna-Kaupa Pond-was a
shallow lagoon on the island of Hawaii that had been converted into a
private marina." 3 Originally the lagoon was separated from an ocean
bay by a barrier beach. Two openings connected the lagoon to the
ocean, but early Hawaiians used the lagoon as a fish pond by
110. 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
Ill. See id. at 174-80 (discussing the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment); Fish
House, Inc. v. Clarke, _ N.C. App. _, _, 693 S.E.2d 208, 211, discretionary review
denied, 364 N.C. 324, 700 S.E.2d 750 (2010) (discussing that no public right exists in a
water that is connected to a navigable-in-fact water). The plaintiff in the Fish House case
unsuccessfully tried to persuade the court of appeals that Kaiser-Aetna and a companion
case, Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp., 444 U.S. 206 (1979) (per curiam), stood "for the
proposition that the privately owned, manmade waterways ... did not become open to
[public] use ... simply [by being connected to] other navigable waterways." Fish House, _
N.C. App. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 211. The court of appeals dismissed that contention on the
grounds that the cases addressed only the question of general public use of navigable
waters in the context of interstate commerce and not the "rights enjoyed by . . . citizens . . .
under the Public Trust Doctrine." Id.
112. Fish House, _ N.C. App. at _, 693 S.E.2d at 211. Similarly, any reliance on
Vaughn, the companion case to Kaiser-Aetna, is misplaced. The waterways at issue in
Vaughn were man-made canals constructed on private property with private funds.
Vaughn, 444 U.S. at 207. The canals system joined other naturally navigable waterways.
Id. In the per curiam opinion, the court held that "no general right of use in the public
arose by reason of the authority over navigation conferred upon Congress by the
Commerce Clause"; however, if the canal system was created through the destruction or
diversion of naturally navigable waterways then the canal system might be open to public
use. Id. at 209. Because there was a factual issue as to whether such destruction or
diversion had occurred, the case was remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 209-10.
113. Kaiser-Aetna, 444 U.S. at 165-68.
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controlling the flow of water into and out of the lagoon by means of
sluice gates.1 4 When the gates were opened, waters and fish from the
bay entered the lagoon."' When the gates were closed, the fish inside
of the lagoon could be netted."16
In 1961, after Kaiser-Aetna acquired the lagoon and surrounding
lands, it dredged and deepened the lagoon and dredged an eight-foot-
deep channel connecting the lagoon to the bay creating the marina."'
Access to the marina was controlled by Kaiser-Aetna."' In 1972, a
dispute arose between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Kaiser-
Aetna, with the Corps contending that the waters of the marina were
"navigable water[s] of the United States," and, as such, open to public
use."l9
When the case reached the Supreme Court of the United States,
the government's theory was that when Kaiser-Aetna dredged and
improved Kaupa Pond, "the pond-although it may once have
qualified as fast land-became navigable water of the United
States."'20 In rejecting the Corps' position, the Court held that
connecting private waters to navigable waters of the United States
does not convert those private waters to "navigable water[s] of the
United States" and open them to public use.' 2' In the Court's view the
position of the government constituted an attempted unconstitutional
taking of Kaiser-Aetna's private property rights.122
The key fact in the Kaiser-Aetna case is that Kuapa Pond, and
other Hawaiian fishponds, have always been considered to be
private property by landowners and by the Hawaiian
government. Such ponds were once an integral part of the
Hawaiian feudal system .... Titles to the fishponds were
recognized to the same extent and in the same manner as rights
in more orthodox fast land.123
Therein lies the distinction. In North Carolina, existing statutory
and case law does not declare the waters located in marinas, boat
basins, or similar facilities created by excavating privately owned
114. Id. at 166.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 166-68.
117. Id. at 167.
118. Id. at 168.
119. Id.
120. Id at 170.
121. Id. at 168; see id. at 172-73, 179-80.
122. Id. at 178-80.
123. Id. at 167.
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uplands and connected to navigable-in-fact waters of North Carolina
to be private waters from which the public may be excluded.
4. Pragmatic Considerations and Sound Public Policy Make
Navigable-in-Fact Man-Made Waters Open to Public Trust Uses
Recognizing the continuing rights of public use of navigable-in-
fact waters that enter an area excavated out of uplands makes sense
from both a practical perspective and as a matter of public policy. A
private boat basin or marina may be created by digging out privately
owned uplands directly adjacent to the existing shoreline instead of
creating the marina or boat basin by dredging navigable-in-fact public
trust waters adjacent to privately owned uplands. 12 4 The end result is
public trust waters flow into the excavated area, covering the
submerged lands that formerly were upland areas. This may be done
for a number of reasons, one of which is that it may be easier to get
the necessary permits for the digging out of the uplands than it would
be to get permits to dredge directly in existing estuarine waters.'25 The
central question is whether title to the submerged lands gives the
marina or boat basin owner a common law right to exclude the public
from the man-made waters within the marina or boat basin.
An easy case is the one in which shorelands are excavated to
create a continuous body of water extending from the natural waters
of a sound or coastal river into the man-made marina excavated out
of adjacent uplands. When that happens, the marina waters may
appear to be simply an indentation in the natural shoreline. To the
boating and fishing public, natural navigable-in-fact waters and man-
made navigable-in-fact waters lying within an excavated portion of
the shoreline are indistinguishable. In such situations, the area of
man-made waters should be treated the same as the area of natural
navigable-in-fact waters. Such a bright line rule avoids the potential
difficulty of drawing imaginary lines in the water to separate the
public from the private.
A perhaps more difficult situation is one in which a man-made
waterbody is connected by a man-made canal to a natural navigable-
in-fact waterway. In these circumstances the separation of the marina
and its artificial connection to the natural navigable-in-fact waterway
124. See 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7H.0208(b)(5) (2010) (describing different
alternatives for siting a marina).
125. See id. (stating that the preferred alternative for the siting of marinas is "an upland
basin site requiring no alteration of wetlands or estuarine habitat").
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is probably apparent to the average boater or fishermen. The central
question then is whether such captured public trust waters retain or
lose their public trust use character and become purely private
waters. This is a matter of public policy and not pragmatic
consideration.
Under existing North Carolina law, neither fee title nor exclusive
rights can be obtained to public trust submerged lands, natural
navigable-in-fact waters, or public trust natural resources without
specific legislative authorization.12 6 The same rule should apply to the
appropriation of navigable-in-fact waters and public trust resources
by developers and other private parties. Public waters and public
natural resources should not become private property simply because
they pass over an imaginary line in the water. Allowing such an
appropriation appears to be more a taking of public property than the
exercise of a private property right. In the absence of specific
legislative authorization, private parties may be able to use public
waters for a private purpose, but their use of the waters should not be
exclusive and should not come free of public trust use rights.
The position of the State of North Carolina is that such captured
waters retain their public trust character.'2 7 According to the North
Carolina Division of Coastal Management, public trust areas include
"all water in artificially created bodies of water containing public
fishing resources or other public resources which are accessible to the
public by navigation from bodies of water in which the public has
rights of navigation." 2 8 Because of the shelter and habitat created by
the piers, docks, and other features in a marina or boat basin,
significant public fishing resources are likely to exist.129
Furthermore, the excavation or creation of a boat basin or canal
will require a state permit, and the applicable rule gives clear notice
to anyone applying for such a permit that the man-made waterbody
126. See, e.g., RJR Technical Co. v. Pratt, 339 N.C. 588, 590, 453 S.E.2d 147, 148 (1995).
Such rights can also not be acquired by prescription. See, e.g., id. at 592, 453 S.E.2d at 149
("North Carolina law does not provide for private acquisition of exclusive or 'several'
fisheries in the State's navigable waters." (citation omitted)). It is noteworthy that both
Gwathmey and RJR were decided by the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the same
year. Gwathmey v. State ex rel. Dep't of Env't, Health, & Natural Res., 342 N.C. 287, 464
S.E.2d 674 (1995).
127. See supra notes 103-09 and accompanying text.
128. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7H.0207 (2010).
129. See supra note 4 (describing important fish species that may be found in such
areas).
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may be open to public use. 130 Among the factors that the State will
take into account "[i]n determining whether the public has acquired
rights in artificially created bodies of water," are:
(3) the value of public resources in the body of water; (4)
whether the public resources in the body of water are mobile to
the extent that they can move into natural bodies of water; (5)
whether the creation of the artificial body of water required
permission from the state. 3'
In light of this rule language and the North Carolina Division of
Coastal Management's statement, owners of man-made marinas, boat
basins, or canals have no expectation that the public may be excluded
from captured public trust waters and natural resources.
The marina, boat basin, or canal owner will still have title to the
underlying submerged lands and may still prohibit unauthorized
people from placing permanent structures in the marina or boat basin
waters. If in particular circumstances, for purposes of public health,
public safety, or the public welfare, limits on public access are
warranted, then reasonable limitations may be imposed by state law,
agency rules, or municipal ordinances.'32
CONCLUSION
On one hand, although the Fish House court's reasoning is
suspect, the court's recognition of the right of public trust uses of
man-made waterbodies connected to natural navigable-in-fact
waterbodies is firmly grounded in good public policy, sound
pragmatic considerations, and existing North Carolina law. On the
130. Any such activity would require a major development permit under state law. See
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-118 (2009) (describing types of developments requiring a major
development permit).
131. 15A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 7H.0207 (2010).
132. Limitations on surfing activities within a specified number of feet from a fishing
pier located in public waters are but one example of such a reasonable restriction on
public trust use rights:
Surfing, body boarding, rafting, boating and other similar water activities are
permitted in the Atlantic Ocean waters within the town limits, except in those
areas located within three hundred (300) feet on either side of any commercial
fishing pier located within the town from March 15 to December 1 of each year.
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other hand, it is important for the courts in the future to clearly
separate the question of ownership of the bottom of a man-made
waterbody from the public ownership of submerged lands lying under
natural navigable-in-fact waterbodies and waterways. The court of
appeals appears to be habitually misreading Gwathmey, a practice
that creates unnecessary confusion in the law and raises unnecessary
anxiety as to the legitimacy of valid private titles to excavated
privately owned uplands that become submerged by reason of an
artificial connection to existing natural navigable-in-fact waters. To
end such confusion and anxiety, the court of appeals must take care in
its opinions to distinguish title determination cases from public trust
use cases.
